Introduction
The relationship between the National Credit Act The question raised in all three of the recent cases was whether or not a debtor's application for debt review in terms of the NCA constitutes an "act of insolvency" in terms of section 8 of the Insolvency Act, upon which a creditor may rely in an application for the compulsory sequestration of the debtor's estate. If it does, it would mean that by resorting to the debt relief measures provided by the NCA a debtor commits the very act on which a creditor may base an application for a sequestration order that, if granted, will render his estate insolvent and bring about the liquidation of his assets. From the debtor's perspective, this is most probably precisely the situation that he endeavours to avert by applying for debt review. Further, sequestration would frustrate the stated purpose of the NCA, which is that debtors should take responsibility for their debts by satisfying them in full 10 and concurrent creditors might ultimately receive a dividend that falls far short of what they are due.
The debt relief measures introduced by the NCA may be regarded, in a sense, as posing alternatives to sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act. The question may be raised whether a debtor's reaching out to the NCA's "lifeline" may, or should, be the very act that triggers his estate's sequestration and its attendant consequences.
In each set of circumstances in Nedbank v Andrews, FirstRand Bank v Evans and
FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg, the court dealt with the issue somewhat differently. It is submitted that this is an important issue, the treatment of which impacts significantly on the efficacy of the South African consumer debt relief system and which therefore merits further discussion.
Background
The sequence of developments began with Ex parte Ford, in which the court refused applications by three debtors for the voluntary surrender of their estates. The reason that the applications were dismissed was that the court regarded an application for debt review in terms of the NCA as the more appropriate route for each over- 12 a notice to a creditor that a consumer-debtor is bound to go for debt review may also amount to an act of insolvency, although the mere commission of an act of insolvency is not in itself sufficient to warrant the granting of a compulsory sequestration order.
In Investec v Mutemeri, the high court held that an application for compulsory sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act did not constitute "enforcement" of an agreement, as envisaged by sections 129 and 130 of the NCA. It held that it also did not constitute the "exercise or enforcement by litigation or other judicial process [of] any right or security" from which the creditor is barred once it has been notified, in terms of section 86(4)(b)(i) of the NCA, that the debtor has applied for debt review.
Essentially, the effect of the decision is that, where a debtor has applied for debt review in terms of the NCA, this does not preclude a creditor from applying for the sequestration of the debtor's estate. Boraine and Van Heerden promptly followed up their initial article with a discussion of the position in the light of the decision in
Investec v Mutemeri, in a second article entitled "To sequestrate or not to sequestrate in view of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005: a tale of two judgments".
13
The authors agreed with the reasoning behind the decision and the correctness in principle of the conclusion reached by the court that an application for sequestration does not amount to "a civil procedure or civil suit in the form of debt enforcement". 14 As they had done in their earlier article in relation to Ex parte Ford, Boraine and Van Heerden extrapolated from the facts in Investec v Mutemeri and, observing that "a debt situation is … not static", they explored ways in which the established precedent ought to be applied and the approach that ought to be adopted in various scenarios. 15 They suggested that in appropriate circumstances the court might consider referring the matter for debt review, using the discretion afforded to it by section 85 of the NCA, before it exercised its discretion to grant a sequestration order in terms of the Insolvency Act. The authors anticipated that this might be an appropriate course for a court to adopt in an application for voluntary surrender in circumstances where it appeared that credit had been extended recklessly. They suggested that this could occur even where the applicant debtor had already undergone debt review, but where it transpired that the latter process had been defective in that, for example, the question of reckless lending had not been properly considered.
16
Boraine and Van Heerden further envisaged that a creditor might seek the sequestration of the estate of a debtor whose obligations arose mainly out of credit agreements and who had already undergone the debt review process. This might be the case where the creditor had rejected repayment terms proposed by the debtor, so that a "stale-mate" situation had arisen, or where an application lodged by the debt counsellor to the court was still pending, or even where the court had issued a debt restructuring order 17 despite the creditor's opposition. The authors considered that in such circumstances there might be "hard facts" available on which the creditor could base its argument that sequestration of the debtor's estate would be preferable. These might include a situation where the creditor was able to show that the repayment period or the monthly repayment amount, according to the restructuring order, was not viable. It might also arise where the debtor had not included in the debt review all of his obligations arising out of credit agreements or where the debtor had stopped making payments after the issue of the court's debt rescheduling order or the filing of the voluntary rescheduling agreement between the parties.
18
15 Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 117-120. 16 Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 119. 17 The terms "debt restructuring", "debt re-arrangement" and "debt rescheduling" are used interchangeably in this work, as are the terms "restructure", "re-arrange" and "reschedule". The words "re-arrange" and "re-arrangement" are spelt thus in order to conform to the spelling employed in the NCA. 18 Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 120. 194 / 231 In Naidoo v ABSA, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the correctness of the decision, in Investec v Mutemeri, that sequestration does not amount to legal proceedings to enforce an agreement, as envisaged by section 129 read with section 130(3) of the NCA. The effect of the decision in Naidoo v ABSA is that, in an application by a creditor for the sequestration of a debtor's estate, the former is not required first to have issued a notice in terms of section 129(1)(a) of the NCA to the debtor. In a case analysis of Naidoo v ABSA entitled "The Appellate Division has spoken …"
19 Maghembe agreed with the decision but expressed concern that the effect of sequestration to deprive a consumer debtor of the option of continuing with the debt review might impact adversely on "the efficiency of the NCA". 20 Maghembe observed that through debt restructuring or a ruling in respect of reckless credit, or even simple negotiation between the parties, a debtor might be in a position to overcome his debt burden and to satisfy his financial obligations in full, which, as he pointed out, is one of the stated purposes of the NCA. What is more, a debtor could avoid a declaration of insolvency with the consequent loss of assets, the social stigma attached to the insolvency, and the fact of being rendered "a less than useful member of society". Maghembe submitted that a debtor should have the choice between insolvency and an alternative debt relief measure. 21 He suggested that sections 88 and 129 of the NCA should be amended to preclude a creditor from applying for the compulsory sequestration of a debtor's estate after it has received a notice informing it that the debtor has applied for debt review in terms of section 86(4)(b)(i), or that a matter has been referred by a court for debt review under section 83 or 85 of the NCA, or without first having issued a section 129 notice to the debtor.
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The more recent judgments in 
Nedbank v Andrews
In Nedbank v Andrews it was common cause that Andrews was indebted to
Nedbank in the amounts of R972 065.37 in respect of a loan agreement, R168
418.38 in respect of a suretyship agreement, R39 391.40 in respect of a credit card facility, and R8 125.63 in respect of an overdraft facility on his current account.
These obligations had been re-arranged in terms of section 87 of the NCA.
23
Nedbank initially brought applications for the sequestration of the estates of both Andrews and his wife, to whom he was married out of community of property.
24
However, Nedbank later withdrew the application against his wife. Andrews opposed the application for the sequestration of his estate.
25
In its founding papers Nedbank sought to rely on three grounds for the sequestration of Andrews' estate. and being placed under debt review he gave notice in writing to the applicant and other creditors that he was unable to pay his debts. It had contended further that the re-arrangement of his debts, which occurred in the debt review process, constituted an act of insolvency envisaged in section 8(e) of the Insolvency Act.
30
Andrews had responded to the allegations contained in the founding papers by contending that Nedbank was not entitled to rely on the proceedings conducted in terms of the NCA as constituting acts of insolvency for the purposes of the Insolvency Act. Andrews also raised the point that Nedbank had participated in the debt review and that it had unsuccessfully applied for the rescission of the debt rearrangement order. However, in view of the fact that Nedbank had withdrawn its allegations of the commission of acts of insolvency and was relying solely on the actual insolvency of Andrews, the court did not deal in more detail with the issues raised by Andrews in this regard. 31 As far as the allegation of actual insolvency was concerned, the court found that In October 2010 Evans informed the bank that he had sold the sectional title unit for an amount of R800 000 in excess of the value attributed to it by the bank. 41 By the time that the sequestration application was heard in February 2011, the default judgment had been rescinded by consent, 42 the sectional title property had been transferred after cancellation of the mortgage bond passed over it, and the proceeds of the sale -an amount of R1 260 208,64 -had been paid to the bank. The proceeds had fully discharged the amount that had been owed to the bank in respect of the commercial loan agreement and the excess had been credited to Evans' loan indebtedness, which was secured by the two mortgage bonds over his home.
Although there was some dispute in relation to the amount that ought to have been 
The decision
The court, per Wallis J, as he then was, stated at the outset that the purpose of a debtor's applying for debt review in terms of section 86(1) of the NCA is always to obtain a declaration that he is over-indebted. Therefore, the court reasoned, "a debtor who informs his creditor that he has applied for, or is under, debt review is necessarily informing the creditor that he is over-indebted and unable to pay his debts". 45 The court considered the lapse of a period of almost a year between the date on which the letter was sent to the creditor and the date on which the application for sequestration was brought. It decided that the appropriate time for determining if a reasonable person in the position of the creditor would have construed the letter as a notice of inability to pay was when the letter was received.
This was because "the question is what it means to the recipient at the time of its receipt".
46
Wallis J viewed the most pertinent fact known to the bank at the time when it received the letter to be that Evans "was significantly in default of his obligation under both the bonds and the loan agreement". He reasoned that the bank, clearly familiar with the provisions of the NCA, would have construed the letter as unequivocally conveying to it that he was unable to repay the amounts borrowed in accordance with his contractual undertakings. 47 The court regarded such a not change the fact that the letter was a notice of inability to pay debts.
50
The main contention put forward on behalf of Evans was that the NCA precluded an application by FirstRand Bank for the sequestration of Evans' estate. 51 Counsel for
Evans submitted that the effect of a debt re-arrangement order is to alter the debtor's contractual obligation to the creditor so that Evans was obliged to pay only a reduced sum every month in discharge of his indebtedness in terms of the mortgage bonds and not the amount upon which they had originally agreed. 52 However, the court did not regard a debt re-arrangement order as altering the contractual obligation between the parties but as merely precluding the creditor from pursuing its contractual rights for so long as the debtor is complying with the debt re-arrangement order. Wallis J pointed out that if the debtor does not comply with the debt rearrangement order the creditor is not restricted to claiming remedies on the basis of "an amended contract". Instead, the bar, or "moratorium", 53 on exercising or enforcing by litigation or other judicial process any right or security under the credit agreement is removed and the creditor is entitled to pursue in full its contractual remedies according to the terms of their original agreement.
However, the court stated that once it is recognised that an application for sequestration does not constitute the enforcement of a credit agreement it must follow that any moratorium to claiming payment under the credit agreement is not a bar to the granting of a sequestration order. According to this reasoning, the fact that a debt re-arrangement order has been issued by the magistrate's court does not necessarily affect the situation. 54 Wallis J considered it important that to hold "that the NCA operates to preclude credit providers from sequestrating the estates of their debtors, but does not prevent other creditors from doing so", would give rise to the anomalous position that credit providers would be placed in "a class of creditor excluded from invoking the mechanisms of the Insolvency Act".
55
In the circumstances, the court decided that all of the requirements in terms of the Insolvency Act for the granting of a provisional sequestration order had been met. In this regard, it stated that the bank had a liquidated claim against Evans for more than R100, Evans had committed an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g), and
sequestration would be to the advantage of creditors as the realisation of Evans'
assets would result in a not negligible dividend for creditors. The court stated that there were also matters that could properly be investigated by a trustee including, in view of the discrepancies in the figures furnished by Evans, the source and amount of his income, the identity of his employer (whom the court suspected might be his 17 year-old son), and the nature of his current business activities. Therefore, all that remained was for the court to consider if it ought to exercise its discretion against granting a provisional sequestration order.
56
Wallis J stated that he was unable to find much authority on how this discretion should be exercised. He noted that this might be an indication of how unusual it is for courts to exercise their discretion in favour of a debtor once all of the requirements had been established on a prima facie basis. He regarded the position as being that in the absence of special or unusual circumstances -which the respondent must establish -the court should ordinarily grant the provisional sequestration order. In this regard Evans relied on the lapse of almost a year between the date on which the letter was sent and the date on which the application for sequestration had been brought. He also relied on his compliance with the debt re-arrangement order indebtedness to the bank by R200 000, as well as the improvement in his overall financial position by reason of the sale of one of the mortgaged properties.
The court dismissed the argument that the lapse of time was material to the proper use of its discretion as it did not regard this as a case where there had clearly been an improvement in the debtor's financial position that would render the act of insolvency "stale". 57 On the contrary, the court expressed the view that it was clear why and "hardly surprising" that the bank brought the application for sequestration when it did. As the court saw it, the bank had been confronted by the prospect of protracted litigation in respect of the default judgment that it had obtained against
Evans. Further, in the face of the latter's mounting indebtedness to it, with the payments which he was making in terms of the debt re-arrangement order not even covering the interest which it was charging in terms of the original agreement, it had chosen to have recourse to sequestration proceedings. The court was also dismissive of Evans' anticipation of discharging his indebtedness to the bank as "overly optimistic" 58 and based on "a highly speculative assumption" about the improvement of his financial position. 59 The court was also sceptical about whether regard the matter before it as being such "a clear case" because it doubted the existence and validity of the debt re-arrangement order. 64 Another factor that weighed against the exercise of the court's discretion in favour of Evans was that it viewed the debt re-arrangement order as purporting to extend his indebtedness to the bank far beyond the terms of the original agreements. 65 Wallis J also considered the submission on behalf of Evans that he was in possession of sufficient income to pay his outstanding indebtedness to the bank in the ordinary course by way of monthly instalments on a loan on conventional terms. Wallis remarked that if this was indeed the position then there should be no reason why Evans could not either apply for reinstatement of his loan from the bank or obtain a loan from another financial institution. Wallis J suspected that he had not done this because his financial position was not as good as had been portrayed by counsel on his behalf.
In the result, the court declined to exercise its discretion in favour of Evans, the respondent, and it granted an order for the provisional sequestration of his estate. 
Comments
The In each application for sequestration FirstRand Bank relied on the commission of an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. It alleged that each respondent had committed such an act of insolvency by applying in terms of section 86(7)(c) of the NCA to be declared over-indebted. To confirm this fact the bank relied on a consumer profile report issued by a credit bureau stating that each of the respondents had applied for debt review. 78 The court, per Goosen J, noted that the credit bureau reports simply reflected that each respondent had "applied for a debt rehabilitation or to be placed under debt review with a registered debt counsellor"
and that no further details were supplied except that application had been made on Further, Goosen J viewed Wallis J's remarks that the position in relation to debt review is not novel but is the same as the position in relation to administration orders whether an act of insolvency had been committed -its commission appeared to have been common cause -but pointed out that the issue was whether it had been established that sequestration would be to the advantage of creditors.
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Goosen J also explained that the procedure to be followed in an application for an administration order in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act is materially different from that required by the NCA for debt review. He pointed out that the former procedure "constitutes a 'modified form of insolvency' applicable to small estates in which a concursus creditorum is created allowing for a court-sanctioned debt rearrangement". 86 Further, an application for an administration order requires the submission of a detailed statement of affairs that sets out the financial affairs of the applicant (the correctness of which must be confirmed under oath by the applicant), a motivation for the basis upon which the applicant is unable to meet his financial obligations and, significantly, the delivery of a notice of the application to creditors. 87 Thus, as Goosen J explained, the application itself meets the requirements of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act in that the debtor gives notice in writing to the creditor that he is unable to pay his debts. Therefore, he stated, the authorities dealing with applications for administration orders ought to be read in this context. 88 Goosen J added that, according to the established precedent relevant to applications for administration orders in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates'
Courts Act, in construing the notice to the creditor for the purposes of determining whether it constitutes an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act or not, the whole content of the application (for an administration order) should be considered. This was required in order to ensure that "the notice conveys an unequivocal statement of inability to pay … and that the creditor receiving the notice can reasonably conclude that the debtor is unable rather than merely unwilling to pay his debts".
89
On the other hand, as Goosen J pointed out, the procedure required for an application for debt review in terms of the NCA is very different from that which an application for an administration order in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act entails. In terms of section 86 of the NCA read with regulation 24 of the Regulations promulgated in terms of it, a consumer debtor applies for debt review by submitting a completed NCR Form 16, together with certain specified documents and information, to a registered debt counsellor. Thereafter, within a stipulated period the debt counsellor is required to issue all credit providers identified in the application with a notice in the prescribed NCR Form 17.1 informing them that an application for debt review has been received. After making a determination, again within a stipulated period, the debt counsellor is obliged to issue a further notice in the prescribed NCR Form 17.2 informing them of the outcome. This would be whether the debtor has been found not to be over-indebted as envisaged by section 79 of the NCA or has been declared to be over-indebted and has been referred to a magistrate for debt restructuring.
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In the result, as Goosen J stated, an application for debt review in terms of section 86 of the NCA does not entail the debtor's giving written notice to the creditor of an inability to pay one or more of his debts. He reasoned further that a notice of inability to pay as envisaged by section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act must be given deliberately and with the intention of giving such notice 91 and must be such that a creditor can reasonably conclude that that the debtor is unable to pay his debts. However, it ought to be borne in mind that in order to constitute an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act, regardless of the fact that the creditor might have construed the notice in this manner, the words of the notification must convey an unequivocal statement by the debtor of his inability to meet his obligations.
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Turning to the facts of the case in FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg, the court noted that the bank had not relied on any written communication to it by each debtor but merely on a profile report issued by a credit bureau reflecting that they had applied for debt review in terms of the NCA. Goosen J also pointed out that the profile report did not contain details of the terms of the application for debt review nor any reference to statements and declarations made by the debtors, nor any information on which the creditor could determine that it was an unequivocal statement of an inability to pay. Thus, in the court's view it did not constitute an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act.
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The court dealt further with the bank's reliance on inferential reasoning in the sense that it contended that a debtor seeks debt review when he is over-indebted and that the very fact that a debtor seeks a declaration of over-indebtedness is indicative of a declaration of an inability to pay one or more of his debts. Goosen J regarded such inferential reasoning not only as unsound but also as contrary to the express requirements of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act, that a debtor must give written notice to a creditor of his inability to pay his debts. 94 The court also alluded to the further difficulty in the matter before it that the written notice relied upon by FirstRand Bank had not been communicated by the debtor but by a credit bureau that did not have the debtors' necessary authority to make declarations on their behalf nor to bind them to declarations made in relation to their affairs. that the principal knew that the letter was being written in those terms and consented to it being so written.
Distinguishing the situation where an act of insolvency may be committed "through an agent" who manages the principal's affairs, 97 Goosen J concluded that the credit bureau had not acted on the basis of any authority specifically conferred on it by the respondents nor on any general authority which bound them. The court further did not find that the content of the credit bureau's report was evidence of the existence of a Form 16 declaration made by the respondents nor that such a declaration in the ordinary course necessarily amounts to a declaration of an inability to pay. Goosen J viewed such reasoning as extending the reach of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act far beyond its purpose.
98
The judgment noted that counsel had pointed out that a Form 17.1 notice had not been delivered to the applicant as required by the NCA and that it did not have access to the Form 16 application made to the debt counsellor. Therefore counsel had argued that the credit bureau's report should be accepted as the best evidence available to it of the commission of the act of insolvency. In relation to this argument, Goosen J stated:
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That may indeed be so but it is not sufficient. An applicant who seeks to invoke the provisions of the Insolvency Act must prove either that an act of insolvency as specifically provided by the Act has been committed or that the respondent is actually insolvent. If the applicant is not able to do so it cannot succeed with the sequestration order.
In the result, the applications for the sequestration of the estates of both respondents were dismissed. 100 introduced by the NCA with the purpose "to assist not only consumers who are overindebted but also those who find themselves in 'strained' circumstances". 102 It is therefore submitted that one cannot assume that a debtor who applies for debt review with a view to having his debts re-arranged is unequivocally declaring that he is unable to pay his debts and not merely conveying an unwillingness to do so in his financially "strained" circumstances. In FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg, Goosen J regarded the inferential reasoning that counsel for FirstRand Bank sought to be applied to the situation, in order to find that an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act had been committed, as excessive. It is submitted that this stance is to be preferred to the approach adopted by Wallis J in FirstRand Bank v Evans that "a debtor who informs his creditor that he has applied for or is under debt review is necessarily informing the creditor that he is over-indebted and unable to pay his debts". However, it may be noted that in terms of section 8(e) a debtor commits an act of insolvency if he "makes or offers to make any arrangement with any of his creditors for releasing him wholly or partially from his debts". Given that the NCA envisages that the debtor will satisfy his debts in full, the offer of the arrangement by the debtor may not necessarily include any proposition for or contemplation of any release from any debts. the NCA might constitute an act of insolvency in terms of the Insolvency Act. 107 Otto and Otto pointed out that it could be argued, on the other hand, that the "wellintentioned legislative initiative" reflected in the NCA's unique procedure, including debt review and re-arrangement, would be frustrated if sequestration might "ipso iure follow upon an application for debt review". In other words, it could be argued that the NCA "as lex specifica should enjoy preference over the Insolvency Act … and insolvency law in this particular instance". 108 However, they left the question open, stating that it remained to be seen what the courts would decide in this respect. In
Comments
FirstRand Bank v Evans, clearly the court held that a letter by a debtor to the creditor conveying the fact of his application for debt review in particular circumstances constitutes an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act.
However, it remains to be seen if this decision will be followed. As noted above, in Collett v FirstRand Bank the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that debt review, a declaration of over-indebtedness, and the rescheduling of debts arising out of credit agreements are "novel concepts" introduced by the NCA with the purpose "to assist not only consumers who are over-indebted, but also those who find themselves in 'strained' circumstances". 111 It is submitted that the effect of the decision in FirstRand Bank v Evans was to counteract such assistance, which in the circumstances the debtor had sought and had already received. If a debtor is making regular payments in accordance with a debt re-arrangement order issued in terms of section 87 of the NCA and his estate is nevertheless sequestrated by a creditor whose claim arises out of an obligation that is subject to the debt re-arrangement order, the debtor is left in an anomalous and vulnerable position. It is submitted that this could not have been what the legislature intended, and that the possibility of this eventuating reflects the presence of a lacuna in the provisions of the NCA.
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In the circumstances, it is submitted that statutory amendments should be brought about to provide for an explicit, workable relationship between the debt review process and sequestration. 113 Consideration should be given to the suggestions made by Maghembe for the amendment of relevant provisions of the NCA to preclude a creditor from bringing an application for the sequestration of the debtor's estate in specific circumstances. 114 However, it is submitted that even more extensive legislative intervention is called for. It is submitted that FirstRand Bank v Evans is indicative of the need, on a practical level, for solutions to be found in order to combat or at least reduce credit grantors' opposition or resistance to debt review and debt restructuring as consumer debt relief measures that pose alternatives to sequestration. 115 From the judgment in FirstRand Bank v Evans it appears that the bank's main concern was the fact that the monthly payment due to it in terms of the debt restructuring order did not even cover the interest which would have been due … [F] or effective help to be made available to the consumer debtor, it should not be structured solely by way of discharge through bankruptcy proceedings, which will be mainly court-driven procedures requiring the involvement of a [sic] insolvency representative or administrator. … Help should also be directed at both finding a solution for the adverse financial situation and, as far as possible, preventing the debtor from getting into debt again.
This may also require an out-of-court or extra-judicial approach and the involvement of a debt counsellor, a consumer advisory bureau or a social worker.
Notably, as part of the "first principle" established in the INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II it is recommended that a debtor should be free to choose between a liquidation procedure and a rehabilitation procedure.
123 A rehabilitation procedure is defined as one which "is designed to give the consumer debtor time to recover from temporary or more permanent liquidity difficulties and provide a way, through debt counseling or debt-restructuring, to reorganize his financial affairs." It is also recommended that upon the successful completion of the procedure "the debtor will obtain discharge or prepare a rehabilitation plan, composition or scheme of arrangement which is typically required to be approved by a majority of the creditors … and … by the court". 124 Forming part of the "first principle" is also the recommendation that:
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Creditors should be prohibited from pursuing the debtor during the insolvency process. If this were otherwise, creditors who chose not to be bound by the process would prevail over those utilizing the collective mechanism.
In addition the law should take into account the issues that are generally provided for in any insolvency law. In this respect reference is made to provisions regarding the handling of encumbered assets and the position of secured creditors, treatment of contracts … and the priority of distribution.
It is submitted that by the phrase "insolvency process", which is to be found in this "first principle", is meant the consumer debt relief process, which includes both liquidation and rehabilitation procedures. provided for by the NCA.

In the "rehabilitation procedure" afforded by the NCA, when a magistrate's court issues a debt restructuring order it has the power in effect to override or overlook "provisions regarding the handling of encumbered assets and the position of secured creditors, treatment of contracts … and the priority of distribution" in that it can restructure obligations between the debtor and even a secured creditor such as a mortgagee of the debtor's home without the secured creditor's specific agreement on the restructured terms. 126 The resultant restructured payment terms may be unsatisfactory or even untenable from the perspective of the mortgagee.
For years academic commentators have pointed out that the South African insolvency regime does not provide for an effective, easily accessible, consumer debt relief mechanism as an alternative to the sequestration process currently available in terms of the Insolvency Act, which entails the liquidation of assets.
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Strong calls have been made for the requirement of the advantage of creditors not to apply invariably, thus denying debtors who are "too poor" the opportunity to benefit by relief from the burden of debt which the Insolvency Act provides through rehabilitation. 128 Commentators have emphasised the need for a consumer debt relief measure that balances the interests of debtors and creditors and society generally. This they envisage through the re-arrangement of debts so that they are payable over a reasonable, limited period and culminating in a measure of discharge from liability in accordance with a policy of providing an "honest" consumer debtor with a "fresh start". This feature is universally accepted as appropriate for an effective consumer debt relief system. 129 They have expressed the desirability of establishing a legislative and administrative framework that facilitates "single portal access" to the insolvency system. 130 (23) provides that between the date of determination of a date for a hearing and the conclusion of the hearing the creditors may not institute any action against the debtor or apply for the liquidation of the debtor's estate without the permission of the court.
Section 118(19) provides for the revocation of the composition by the court in certain circumstances, such as where the debtor has failed to comply with its obligations.
Presumably in such circumstances the estate of the debtor may thereafter be liquidated. However, these are details that would need to be specifically considered in the formulation of a new, appropriately devised and worded provision in the applicable insolvency legislation. reduce credit grantors' opposition or resistance to debt review and debt restructuring under the NCA. It is imperative that debt restructuring orders should be viable in that they provide for debtors' obligations to be fulfilled on terms that are reasonable both in respect of instalment amounts and time periods for payment as well as taking into account the original payment terms contracted for and prevailing interest rates.
It has been submitted by a commentator that certain sections of the NCA should be amended in order to clarify the relationship between the NCA and the Insolvency Act to preclude the bringing of an application for the sequestration of a debtor's estate once he has applied for debt review and after a debt restructuring order has been issued. This would indeed be a valid consideration. However, it is of great concern that the consumer debt relief system and procedure, including the debt review and Debt Report II, it is recommended that a debtor should be free to choose between a liquidation procedure and a rehabilitation procedure, the latter including a debt restructuring procedure. Further, on successful completion of such a rehabilitation procedure the debtor should receive a measure of discharge from liability that has been approved by a majority of creditors. In addition, the INSOL International
Consumer Debt Report II recommends that creditors should be "prohibited from pursuing the debtor during the insolvency process" or "collective mechanism" and it
anticipates that the claims of secured and preferent creditors will not be affected.
In the circumstances, it is submitted that legislative intervention is required. It is submitted that consideration should be given to modifying section 118 of the 
